Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games

Ola Andersson and Erik Wengström

No 725, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure-strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of McCutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.

Keywords: Noncooperative game theory; Weak Renegotiation-proofness; Costly Renegotation; Repeated Bertrand games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2010-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games (2010)
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