Economics at your fingertips  

Do People Care about Social Context? Framing Effects in Dictator Games

Anna Dreber (), Tore Ellingsen (), Magnus Johannesson () and David Rand ()
Additional contact information
David Rand: Harvard University, Postal: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, 1 Brattle Sq Suite 6, Cambridge MA, 02138, USA

No 738, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing effects are also present when only one of the subjects makes a decision, in which case the frame may only affect preferences. We find that behavior is insensitive to social framing.

Keywords: beliefs; preferences; framing effects; altruism; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
Date: 2011-09-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helena Lundin ().

Page updated 2019-07-22
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0738