Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets

Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson

No 605, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase. The government internalizes that restructuring increases the sales price not only from the increase in the acquirer's profit, but also from a reduced profit for the non-acquirer, whose profits decrease due to its rival's restructuring. We also identify situations where a slow sale can significantly reduce the sales price because of strategic investment and product market effects.

Keywords: Privatization; Asset Ownership; Restructuring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L10 L33 L40 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2003-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Related works:
Working Paper: Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets (2005)
Working Paper: Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0605

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