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Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets

Pehr-Johan Norbäck () and Lars Persson

No 4871, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that a net revenue maximizing government has a stronger incentive to restructure than a profit maximizing acquiring firm: A restructuring firm only takes into account how much its own profit will increase. The government internalizes that restructuring increases the sales price not only due to the increase in the acquirer's profit, but also due to a reduced profit for the non-acquirer, whose profits decrease due to its rival's restructuring. We also identify situations where a slow sale can significantly reduce the sales price because of strategic investment and product market effects.

Keywords: asset ownership; oligopoly; privatization; restructuring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L13 L33 L40 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2005-01
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