Deadlines and Distractions

Maria Saez-Marti and Anna Sjögren

No 618, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We analyze the effect of deadlines on timing of effort when agents are occasionaly distracted. We show that agents precautiously work early when completion of the task is uncertain, but rather likely. Agents who are rarely distracted will always postpone effort since the risk of not completing is small. As a result, increasing the probability of being distracted may even increase the likelihood of meeting the deadline. We further show that introducing the possibility of having the deadline extended may improve the total probability of completing the task without reducing the probability of completing within the originally announced deadline.

Keywords: Deadlines; Timing of Effort; Optimal Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 J22 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-04-13, Revised 2004-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deadlines and distractions (2008)
Working Paper: Deadlines and Distractions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0618

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