Deadlines and Distractions

Maria Saez-Marti and Anna Sj�gren
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Sjögren

No 347, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We consider a principal-agent model in which a task, demanding a sequence of efforts by the agent, must be completed by a certain date. Effort is not contractible. Agents are subject to shocks affecting their opportunity cost of time such that they are distracted from work when the opportunity cost of time is high. We show that the probability that a task is completed by the deadline is a non-monotonic function of the agent�s probability of being distracted. The anticipation of future distractions induces rational agents to get started earlier for precautionary reasons. As a result, agents who are more often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. Principals can increase the probability that the task is completed, and thus achieve higher profits, by strategically setting "tight" deadlines, provided that these can later be extended with a positive probability.

Keywords: Deadlines; time-consistency; timing of effort; optimal incentives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 J22 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Deadlines and distractions (2008)
Working Paper: Deadlines and Distractions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:347

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