Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts

Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi and Robert Staiger

No 689, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. Inspite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.

Keywords: Trade Agreement; WTO; GATT; Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2007-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2010)
Working Paper: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2007)
Working Paper: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0689

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