Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Henrik Horn (),
Giovanni Maggi and
Robert Staiger ()
No 6037, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements.
Keywords: endogenously incomplete contracts; GATT; trade agreement; WTO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Journal Article: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2010)
Working Paper: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2007)
Working Paper: Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6037
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=6037
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().