Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game

Tommy Andersson

No 2004:23, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty.

Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing; Budget-Balance; Cooperative Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D31 D63 D82 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2004-11-05, Revised 2006-01-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mic
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Published as Andersson, Tommy, 'Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game' in Metroeconomica, 2007, pages 503-513.

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Journal Article: NON‐LINEAR PRICING AS A COOPERATIVE GAME (2007)
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