NON‐LINEAR PRICING AS A COOPERATIVE GAME

Tommy Andersson

Metroeconomica, 2007, vol. 58, issue 4, 503-513

Abstract: This paper characterizes non‐linear outlay schedules that are based on a cooperative surplus‐sharing game with transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non‐empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy‐free core to be non‐empty.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00284.x

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Working Paper: Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game (2006)
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