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Strategic Self-Ignorance

Linda Thunstrom, Jonas Nordström, Jason Shogren, Mariah Tanner Ehmke and Klaas van 't Veld ()

No 2013:17, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

Keywords: Experiment; Information; Ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2013-05-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic self-ignorance (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategic Self-Ignorance (2012) Downloads
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