Second Thoughts on Free Riding
Ulrik H. Nielsen (),
Jean-Robert Tyran () and
Erik Wengström ()
Additional contact information
Ulrik H. Nielsen: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Postal: Öster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark
No 2013:29, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.
Keywords: Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-lam, nep-ltv, nep-neu and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Second thoughts on free riding (2014)
Working Paper: Second Thoughts on Free Riding (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_029
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Edgerton ().