Strategy-Proof Package Assignment

Albin Erlanson () and Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

No 2013:43, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.

Keywords: Package assignment; Indivisible objects; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D47 D61 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2013-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Strategy-proof package assignment (2014)
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