Strategy-proof package assignment
Albin Erlanson and
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak ()
No 5/2014, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
Keywords: Package assignment; Indivisible objects; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D61 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Package Assignment (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_005
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