Risk and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games
Stepan Vesely () and
Erik Wengström ()
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Stepan Vesely: Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Postal: Edvard Bulls veg 1, , 7491 Trondheim, , Norway
No 2017:3, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics
Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.
Keywords: risk pooling; risk sharing; social norms; linear public goods game; cooperation decay; stable cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D80 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2017_003
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