Delegation Decisions in Finance
Felix Holzmeister (),
Martin Holmén (),
Michael Kirchler (),
Matthias Stefan () and
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Martin Holmén: University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, Centre for Finance
Michael Kirchler: University of Innsbruck, Department of Banking and Finance
Matthias Stefan: University of Innsbruck, Department of Banking and Finance
No 2020:24, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics
We run an online experiment with finance professionals and subjects from the general population (clients) to examine drivers and implications of clients' delegation decisions. We find that clients favor delegation to investment algorithms, followed by delegation to finance professionals with aligned incentives and lastly to those with fixed incentives. We also show that trust in investment algorithms or money managers (finance professionals), respectively, and clients' propensity to shift blame on others increases the likelihood of delegation, whereas own decision-making quality is associated with a decrease. In measuring the implications of clients' delegation decisions, we report high variability among finance professionals' perceptions of clients' preferred risk levels. We show that this results in overlaps in portfolio risk across risk-levels of clients, indicating problems of risk communication between clients and their money managers.
Keywords: Experimental finance; finance professionals; delegation decisions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 G11 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Working Paper: Delegation Decisions in Finance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2020_024
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