Deductibles in Health Insurances: Pay or Pain?
Geir Asheim (),
Anne Wenche Emblem and
Tore Nilssen ()
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Anne Wenche Emblem: School of Management, Agder University College, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
No 13/2002, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics
We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
Keywords: health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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Published in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2003, pages 253-266.
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Working Paper: Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2002_013
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