Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?

Geir Asheim, Tore Nilssen () and Anne Wenche Emblem ()
Additional contact information
Anne Wenche Emblem: School of Management, Postal: Agder University College, Norway

No 2002:13, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.

Keywords: Health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-06-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2002/HERO2002_13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Deductibles in Health Insurances: Pay or Pain? (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme HERO / Department of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kristi Brinkmann Lenander ().