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Fractionalization and the size of government

Jo Lind

No 21/2003, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters then care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. All these results hold even if a poor group is in majority. Using a panel data set for the US constructed from micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases and between race inequality decreases redistribution.

Keywords: Fractionalization; political economy; inequality; redistribution; race (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 E62 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2003-08-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Lind, Jo Thori, 'Fractionalization and the size of government' in Journal of Public Economics , 2007, pages 51-76.

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Journal Article: Fractionalization and the size of government (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: Fractionalization and the Size of Government (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Fractionalization and the Size of Government (2003) Downloads
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