Fractionalization and the Size of Government

Jo Lind

No 383, LIS Working papers from LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg

Abstract: I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. All these results hold even if a poor group forms a majority. Using a panel data set constructed from US micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution.

Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/383.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fractionalization and the size of government (2007)
Working Paper: Fractionalization and the Size of Government (2003)
Working Paper: Fractionalization and the size of government (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lis:liswps:383

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIS Working papers from LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Piotr Paradowski ().