Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games*

Geir Asheim and Andrés Perea ()
Additional contact information
Andrés Perea: Maastricht University, Postal: EpiCenter and Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands, http://www.epicenter.name/Perea/

No 10/2017, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the concepts of preference restrictions and likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. Finally, we use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; proper rationalizability; iterated admissibility; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2017-10-01, Revised 2018-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games (2019)
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