Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games

Geir Asheim and Andrés Perea ()
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Andrés Perea: Maastricht University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 4, No 9, 1275 pages

Abstract: Abstract We provide comparable algorithms for the Dekel–Fudenberg procedure, iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility by means of the notions of likelihood orderings and preference restrictions. The algorithms model reasoning processes whereby each player’s preferences over his own strategies are completed by eliminating likelihood orderings. We apply the algorithms for comparing iterated admissibility, proper rationalizability and full permissibility, and provide a sufficient condition under which iterated admissibility does not rule out properly rationalizable strategies. We also use the algorithms to examine an economically relevant strategic situation, namely a bilateral commitment bargaining game. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our algorithms for epistemic analysis.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; Proper rationalizability; Iterated admissibility; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00680-6

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