Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study*
Geir Godager (),
Heike Hennig-Schmidt and
Tor Iversen ()
No 2014:4, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme
Quality improvements in markets for medical care are key objectives in any Health reform. An important question is whether disclosing physicians’ performance can contribute to achieving these goals. Due to the asymmetric information inherent in medical markets, one may argue that changes in the information structure are likely to influence the environment in which health care providers operate. In a Laboratory experiment with medical students that mimics a physician decision-making environment we analyze the effect of disclosing performance information to peers. We find that making performance transparent has a positive impact in that significantly higher total patient benefits are generated than under a regime where physician performance is private information. Also, significantly more patients receive benefit-maximizing treatment. We discuss policy implications of our findings
Keywords: Physician payment system; laboratory experiment; incentives; transparency; fee-for-service; information and product quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H40 I11 J33 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-hrm
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Journal Article: Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study (2016)
Working Paper: Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study* (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2014_004
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