Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study*

Geir Godager, Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Tor Iversen

No 2015:5, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: Quality improvements in markets for medical care are key objectives in any Health reform. An important question is whether disclosing physicians’ performance can contribute to achieving these goals. Due to the asymmetric information inherent in medical markets, one may argue that changes in the information structure are likely to influence the environment in which health care providers operate. In a Laboratory experiment with medical students that mimics a physician decision-making environment we analyze the effect of disclosing performance information to peers. Our results suggest that the information structure does influence the individual physician’s supply of medical services. Under performance disclosure, choices that are in accordance with the medical norm or maximize the joint benefit become more frequent.

Keywords: Physician payment system; laboratory experiment; incentives; performance disclosure; fee-for-service; information and product quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H40 I11 J33 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study (2016)
Working Paper: Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study* (2014)
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