Amissibility and Common Belief

Geir Asheim and Martin Dufwenberg

No 2000:6, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

Keywords: Admissibility; Denkel-Fudenberg; common belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Admissibility and common belief (2003)
Working Paper: Admissibility and common belief (2000)
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