Price Subsidies versus Public Provision
Sören Blomquist and
Vidar Christiansen ()
Additional contact information
Vidar Christiansen: Oslo University, Postal: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
No 1997:12, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics
The paper discusses which redistributional policies are efficient when the identity of the high and low skill persons is private information. Our major purpose is to identify the more efficient policy when, presumably for administrative reasons, the policy option is confined to the choice between a price subsidy or public provision in addition to income taxation. We also study the simultaneous use of nonlinear taxation, commodity taxation and public provision of private goods.
Keywords: price subsidy; public provision; private goods; in-kind transfers; optimal taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H42 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in International Tax and Public Finance, 1998, pages 283-306.
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Journal Article: Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision (1998)
Working Paper: Price Subsidies versus Public Provision
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1997_012
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