Price Subsidies versus Public Provision

Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen

No 97-08, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper discusses which distributional policies are efficient when the identity of the high and low skill persons is private information. Our major purpose is to identify the more efficient policy when, presumably for administrative reasons, the policy option is confined to the choice between a price subsidy or public provision in addition to income taxation. We also study the simultaneous use of nonlinear taxation, commodity taxation and public provision of of private goods.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision (1998)
Working Paper: Price Subsidies versus Public Provision (1997)
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