The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

Martin Dufwenberg, Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse () and Stef Tijs
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Stef Tijs: CentER for Economic Research, Postal: Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

No 1998:11, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

Keywords: Consistency; set-valued solutions; normative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1998-05-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2001, pages 119-131.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory (2001)
Working Paper: The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory (2001)
Working Paper: The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory (1998)
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