Divided They Fall: Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability

Luca Repetto, Davide Cipullo and Felipe Carozzi ()
Additional contact information
Felipe Carozzi: Department of Geography and Environment, Postal: London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK

No 2020:1, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.

Keywords: Government Stability; Fragmentation; No-confidence votes; Bargaining; Alignment effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H70 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2020-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1416952/FULLTEXT01.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2020_001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ulrika Öjdeby ().