Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability

Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo and Luca Repetto

No 14619, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.

Keywords: Government stability; Fragmentation; No-confidence votes; Bargaining; Alignment effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H7 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall: Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2020)
Working Paper: Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability (2019)
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