Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War
Massimo Morelli () and
Dominic Rohner
No 80, HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network
Abstract:
We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.
Keywords: Natural Resources; Conflict; Strength Proportionality; Resource Proportionality; Secession; Bargaining Failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010) 
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010) 
Working Paper: Natural resource distribution and multiple forms of civil war (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hic:wpaper:80
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