Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War

Massimo Morelli () and Dominic Rohner

No ECO2010/33, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential con.icts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist con.ict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.

Keywords: Natural Resources; Conflict; Strength Proportionality; Resource Proportionality; Secession; Bargaining Failure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010)
Working Paper: Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (2010)
Working Paper: Natural resource distribution and multiple forms of civil war (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/33

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