Employee Discrimination against Female Executives

Naomi Kodama and Kazuhiko Odaki ()

No 611, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: The theory of employee discrimination gives a possible explanation for the scarcity of female executive officers. This paper tests the employee discrimination hypothesis by measuring the wage premium received by employees working with female executives against their tastes for discrimination. Using a fixed effects analysis of establishment-level panel data on Japanese employees, we separate the discrimination premiums that would otherwise cause a bias from the establishment-level unobserved productivity and unobserved employee characteristics by gender of executives. Our findings reveal that both male and female employees receive small but significant wage premiums (0.6-0.9 percent) when working for female executives.

Keywords: employee discrimination; female executive; compensating wage differential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J33 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26001/cis_dp611.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:611

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().