Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Fumitoshi Moriya, 文利 森谷, Takuro Yamashita and 拓朗 山下

No HIAS-E-18, Discussion paper series from Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This study addresses optimal information allocation in team production. We present a unique implementation problem of desirable effort levels and show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform the agents even if they are ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that the asymmetric information allocation is effective in avoiding "bad" equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure. This analysis provides an explanation as to why informing agents asymmetrically might be beneficial in improving the agents' coordination behaviors.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Unique implementation; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2015-12-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/27651/070_hiasDP-E-18.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2020)
Working Paper: Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-18

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