Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Fumitoshi Moriya and Takuro Yamashita

No 18-941, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In the context of team production, this paper studies the optimal (deterministic and stochastic) information allocation that implements desired effort levels as the unique Bayesian equilibrium. We show that, under certain conditions, it is optimal to asymmetrically inform agents even though they may be ex ante symmetric. The main intuition is that informing the agents asymmetrically can be effective in avoiding "bad" equilibria, that is, equilibria with coordination failure.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Unique implementation; Asymmetric information allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2020)
Working Paper: Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32884

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