Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results

Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara (), 直毅 吉原 and ナオキ ヨシハラ

No 555, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals bymechanisms with some types of strategyspace reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.

Keywords: Nash implementation; canonical-mechanisms; s-mechanisms; partial-honesty; permissive results (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/19454/DP555.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results (2011)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:555

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