Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially honest agents, which presume that there exists at least one individual in the society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that, in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.

Keywords: Nash implementation; canonical-mechanisms; s-mechanisms; self-relevant mechanisms; partial-honesty; permissive results. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D03 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28838/5/MPRA_paper_28838.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results (2011)
Working Paper: Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28838

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().