An Equitable Nash Solution to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems

Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No 680, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper studies the Nash solution to non-convex bargaining problems. Given the multiplicity of the Nash solution in this context, we refine the Nash solution by incorporating an equity consideration. The proposed refinement is defined as the composition of the Nash solution and a variant of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We then present an axiomatic characterization of the new solution.

Keywords: non-convex bargaining problem; Nash solution; equitable Nash solution; equity principle; binary weak axiom of revealed preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/29632/DP680.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems (2019)
Working Paper: An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:680

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