An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems

Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, vol. 48, issue 3, No 3, 769-779

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the Nash solution to non-convex bargaining problems. Given the multiplicity of the Nash solution in this context, we refine the Nash solution by incorporating an equity consideration. The proposed refinement is defined as the composition of the Nash solution and a variant of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. We then present an axiomatic characterization of the new solution.

Keywords: Non-convex bargaining problem; Nash solution; Equitable Nash solution; Equity principle; Binary weak axiom of revealed preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-019-00658-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: An Equitable Nash Solution to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems (2018)
Working Paper: An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00658-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00658-4

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().