経営者の在職期間と投資の効率性, Top Executive Tenure and Investment Efficiency

惣平 石田, Souhei Ishida, 豊彦 蜂谷 and Toyohiko Hachiya

No 199, Working Paper Series from Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: 本研究は経営者の在職期間と投資の効率性との関係を検証している。本研究の主たる発見事項は次の通りである。ひとつには就任して間もない経営者ほどは非効率的な投資，特に過少投資を行うことがわかった。いまひとつは在職期間の最終年度にいる経営者もまた過少投資を行う可能性が高く，その結果投資の効率性が悪化することが示された。これらの検証結果は，在職期間のある局面において経営者は機会主義的に投資水準を決定することを示している。, This study examines the relation between top executive tenure and investment efficiency. Our results are as follows. First, top executives are more likely to invest inefficiently, particularly underinvest, in the early years than in the later years of their service. Second, they are more likely to underinvest and efficiency of their investment is lower in the final year as compared to their other years in office. These results show that top executives opportunistically decide the level of investment at a certain point in their tenure.

Keywords: 経営者の在職期間; 投資の効率性; キャリア・コンサーン; 期間問題; 地位の獲得; Top Executive Tenure; Investment Efficiency; Carrier Concern; Horizon Problem; Winning Position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
Note: 2016/5/12 論文データ（PDF）を取り下げ。
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