The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools

Reiko Aoki, 玲子 青木, レイコ アオキ, Sadao Nagaoka, 貞男 長岡 and サダオ ナガオカ

No 222, Discussion Paper from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also examine the traditional RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing condition. We suggest formation, licensing and rent distribution methods more conducive to a successful patent pool operation.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2004-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/14239/pie_dp222.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
Working Paper: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
Working Paper: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:piedp1:222

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