The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools

Reiko Aoki and Sadao Nagaoka

Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We examine patent pools in the context of a consortium standard. Although such pools of complementary technologies are approved by antitrust authorities, the actual implementation has proved to be problematic. We identify two possible obstacles: free riding and bargaining failure. We also examine the traditional RAND(reasonable and non-discriminatory)licensingcondition. We suggest formation, licensing and rent distribution methods more conducive to a successful patent pool operation.

Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
Working Paper: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
Working Paper: The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools (2004)
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