The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining
Michael Lovenheim () and
Alexander Willén ()
No 2018-055, Working Papers from Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group
We analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to duty-to-bargain laws in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93%), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42 and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male non-cognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings.
Keywords: collective bargaining; education; labor union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I26 J24 J45 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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http://humcap.uchicago.edu/RePEc/hka/wpaper/Lovenh ... acher-bargaining.pdf First version, July, 2018 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining (2019)
Working Paper: The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining (2018)
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