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The Long-Run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining

Michael Lovenheim () and Alexander Willén ()

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2019, vol. 11, issue 3, 292-324

Abstract: We analyze how exposure to teacher collective bargaining affects long-run outcomes for students, exploiting the timing of state duty-to-bargain law passage in a cross-cohort difference-in-difference framework. Among men, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law in the first 10 years after passage depresses annual earnings by $2,134 (3.93 percent), decreases weekly hours worked by 0.42, and reduces employment and labor force participation. The earnings estimate implies that current duty-to-bargain laws reduce earnings by $213.8 billion annually. Effects grow with time since law passage, are largest among nonwhites, and are not evident for women. Duty-to-bargain laws reduce male noncognitive skills, supporting the labor market findings.

JEL-codes: I21 J22 J31 J45 J51 J52 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170570
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining (2016) Downloads
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