Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

Marco Mariotti

No 98/16, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. The characterisation is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. It is also shown that a subset of Nash's axioms imply the Suppes-Sen relation.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1998-02, Revised 1998-02
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Journal Article: Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory (1999)
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