Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

Marco Mariotti

The Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, issue 3, 733-741

Abstract: The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterized by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. This allows a clear interpretation of the NBS as a fair arbitration scheme. In addition, the proposed characterization is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems.

Date: 1999
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