PROMOTING STUDENT'S EFFORT: STANDARS VERSUS TOURNAMENTS

Pedro Landeras () and J. M. Pérez de Villarreal ()
Additional contact information
J. M. Pérez de Villarreal: Universidad de Cantabria

Working Papers from Instituto de Estudios Fiscales

Abstract: . We analyze the incidence in student’s effort from implementing two different reward systems: a standard-based model and a tournament. In the former we work in detail the effects on effort due to changes in rewards, risk level, socieconomic background and passing standard, while in the later we focus on the Nash equilibrium solution for a symmetrical academic context between two students. We examine conditions under which standards perform better than tournaments in terms of induced effort, and viceversa. We show this depends crucially on the nature of the noise distorting academic achievement. Particularly relative advantage becomes a function of correlation between individual noises.

Keywords: Educational Standards; Tournaments; Student's effort; Incentives in Education. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2003_18.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.ief.es:443 (Bad file descriptor) (http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2003_18.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2003_18.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hpe:wpaper:y:2003:i:18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Miguel Gómez de Antonio ().