Regulation and Distrust

Philippe Aghion, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (400)

Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/1249064 ... and%20Regulation.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:12490649

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