Regulation and Distrust

Philippe Aghion, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Andrei Shleifer

No 14648, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

JEL-codes: K2 P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law, nep-reg and nep-soc
Note: CF POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Published as Philippe Aghion & Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "Regulation and Distrust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1015-1049, August.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2010)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
Working Paper: Regulation and Distrust (2009)
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