EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions

Alvin Roth (), Axel Ockenfels and Dan Ariely

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: A great deal of late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as eBay, which employ a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as those run by Amazon, which employ similar auction rules, but use an ending rule that automatically extends the auction if necessary after the scheduled close until ten minutes have passed without a bid. This paper reports an experiment that allows us to examine the effect of the different ending rules under controlled conditions, without the other differences between internet auction houses that prevent unambiguous interpretation of the field data. We find that the difference in auction ending rules is sufficient by itself to produce the differences in late bidding observed in the field data. The experimental data also allow us to examine how individuals bid in relation to their private values, and how this behavior is shaped by the different opportunities for learning provided in the auction conditions.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Rand Journal of Economics

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/2579649/Roth_internet.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2005)
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2002) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579649

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-17
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579649