An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions
Alvin Roth (),
Axel Ockenfels and
Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics
A great deal of late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as eBay, which employ a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as those run by Amazon, which employ similar auction rules, but use an ending rule that automatically extends the auction if necessary after the scheduled close until ten minutes have passed without a bid. This paper reports an experiment that allows us to examine the effect of the different ending rules under controlled conditions, without the other differences between internet auction houses that prevent unambiguous interpretation of the field data. We find that the difference in auction ending rules is sufficient by itself to produce the differences in late bidding observed in the field data. The experimental data also allow us to examine how individuals bid in relation to their private values, and how this behavior is shaped by the different opportunities for learning provided in the auction conditions.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Rand Journal of Economics
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2005)
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2003)
Working Paper: An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:2579649
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().